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Abstract
We show that it is possible for the so-called weak locking capacity of a quantum channel
[Guha et al., Phys. Rev. X 4:011016, 2014] to be much larger than its private capacity.
Both reflect different ways of capturing the notion of reliable communication via a quantum
system while leaking almost no information to an eavesdropper; the difference is that the
latter imposes an intrinsically quantum security criterion whereas the former requires only a
weaker, classical condition. The channels for which this separation is most straightforward
to establish are the complementary channels of classical-quantum (cq-)channels, and hence
a subclass of Hadamard channels. We also prove that certain symmetric channels (related to
photon number splitting) have positive weak locking capacity in the presence of a vanishingly
small pre-shared secret, whereas their private capacity is zero.
These findings are powerful illustrations of the difference between two apparently natural
notions of privacy in quantum systems, relevant also to quantum key distribution (QKD):
the older, na¨ıve one based on accessible information, contrasting with the new, composable
one embracing the quantum nature of the eavesdropper’s information.
Assuming an additivity conjecture for constrained minimum output Re´nyi entropies, the
techniques of the first part demonstrate a single-letter formula for the weak locking capacity
of complements to cq-channels, coinciding with a general upper bound of Guha et al. for
these channels. Furthermore, still assuming this additivity conjecture, this upper bound
is given an operational interpretation for general channels as the maximum weak locking
capacity of the channel activated by a suitable noiseless channel.
1 Introduction
Information locking [10] remains one of the most curious manifestations of the quantum nature
of information, which is in contrast to our (human) exclusively classical access to it. It is based
on the simple (yet nontrivial) observation that the accessible information in a non-orthogonal
ensemble through a measurement can be smaller, indeed much smaller, than the Holevo infor-
mation. This occurs already for two mutually unbiased bases, by the Maassen-Uffink entropic
uncertainty relation [26], and the crucial realization is that availability of the basis information
(one bit) before the measurement is made can raise the accessible information by an arbitrary
amount, depending on the system size.
This throws into sharp contrast two security criteria for quantum cryptography: the “na¨ıve”
one, which only asks for the eavesdropper to have small accessible information about the key,
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and the “correct”, composable one, which demands that the quantum mutual information is
small [22]. In fact, in [22] it was shown that this choice can make a big difference: a large key
may appear private according the former criterion, but not under the latter.
Quantifying this difference, Guha et al. have recently introduced the notion of locking capac-
ity of a channel [12], following Lloyd’s suggestion of “quantum enigma machines” [24]; actually
two capacities, one strong, and one weak locking capacity of a channel. Here we will only look
at the weak variant, which is the largest rate of asymptotically reliable classical communication
between the “legal” users (Alice and Bob), such that the accessible information of the eaves-
dropper observing the channel environment (complementary channel output), about a uniformly
distributed message, goes to zero.
To be precise, let Alice and Bob be connected by a quantum channel, i.e. a completely
positive and trace preserving (cptp) map N : L(A) −→ L(B), with (here: finite dimensional)
Hilbert spaces A and B. It has a Stinespring dilation, via an essentially unique isometry
V : A →֒ B ⊗ E, where E is the eavesdropper’s system (Eve): N (ρ) = TrE V ρV †. Tracing
over B instead yields the complementary channel N c(ρ) = TrB V ρV † from Alice to Eve. All of
our discussion of privacy will be in this model, which is a quantum version of Wyner’s wiretap
channel [39].
To communicate via n instances of the channel, Alice and Bob employ an (n, ǫ)-code, which
is a collection {(ρm,Dm) : m = 1, . . . , N} consisting of states ρm on An and POVM elements
Dm on B
n (i.e. Dm ≥ 0,
∑
mDm = 1 ), with the property that the estimate m̂ of m obtained
by measuring (Dm) on the channel output is very likely to equal m, which is assumed to be
drawn uniformly:
Perr = Pr{M 6= M̂} = 1
N
N∑
m=1
Tr
(N⊗n(ρm)(1 −Dm)) ≤ ǫ. (1)
Given a code, we call it δ-private (for the channel N ) if there exists a state ω0 on En such that
1
N
N∑
m=1
∥∥(N c)⊗n(ρm)− ω0∥∥1 ≤ δ. (2)
This condition captures precisely the commonly accepted notion of private communication,
since it says that Eve’s output is typically close to a constant, independent of the message m.
Strictly speaking, the above notion is that of a secret key generation code, since we impose an
a priori uniform distribution on the m’s.
Finally, the code is called δ-weakly-locked (always for the same channel N ), if for every
POVM (Qj) on E
n there exists a probability distribution Ω = (Ωj) such that
1
N
N∑
m=1
∑
j
∣∣Tr[(N c)⊗n(ρm)Qj]− Ωj∣∣ ≤ δ. (3)
By the contractive property of the trace norm under cptp maps (in this case σ 7→∑j |j〉〈j|Tr σQj),
the δ-private property implies δ-weak-locking. Guha et al. [12] have also defined the notion of
strong locking, which boils down to the set of signal states ρm satisfying eq. (3) for the identity
channel N c, i.e. constant channel N :
1
N
N∑
m=1
∑
j
∣∣Tr ρmQj − Ωj∣∣ ≤ δ. (4)
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However, we shall not prove any new results on strongly locked codes, and include the definition
only for completeness, see however recent progress in [25].
Following [12], the code in fact may depend on a sublinear secret key k (i.e. of o(n) bits)
pre-shared between Alice and Bob, so that in eq. (1) the states ρmk and POVMs elements Dmk
depend on m and k, and the error probability includes also an average over k. On the other
hand, in the privacy and weak-locking conditions, eqs. (2) and (3), we have to put ρm = Ekρmk,
the average over the key k, because it is unknown to Eve. An equivalent way of including the
pre-shared key, which we prefer here as it allows us to keep the above definitions of wiretap
channel codes, is to grant Alice and Bob the use of o(n) instances of an ideal qubit channel
(which automatically is perfectly private) in addition to the n instances of N . Then all we have
to do is to substitute id
⊗o(n)
2 ⊗N⊗n for the main channel in eqs. (1), (2) and (3) above.
With these notions, we can give the definitions of channel capacities as the largest asymptotic
rate R = 1n logN attainable with arbitrarily small error:
P (N ) := sup{R : ∃ δ-private (n, ǫ)-codes with N ≥ 2nR, ǫ, δ → 0} ,
LW (N ) := sup
{
R : ∃ δ-weakly-locked (n, ǫ)-codes with N ≥ 2nR, ǫ, δ → 0} ,
LS(N ) := sup
{
R : ∃ δ-strongly-locked (n, ǫ)-codes with N ≥ 2nR, ǫ, δ → 0} ,
are the private, weak locking and strong locking capacity, respectively. By definition, LS(N ) ≤
LW (N ) and P (N ) ≤ LW (N ) ≤ C(N ), the latter being the classical capacity of N . It can be
shown that the quantum capacity Q(N ) is a lower bound on LS(N ), but the relation between
P (N ) and LS(N ) is unknown [12].
In cryptographic contexts, we would also worry about the speed of convergence of ǫ and
δ, usually by introducing exponential decay rates, ǫ = 2−nE, δ = 2−nS (S > 0 is called a
security parameter), in which case we would have to study the tradeoff between rate R and the
error/security rates E and S. The private capacity P (N ) has been determined in [8, 5] and
from the proof we know that by letting E > 0 and S > 0 sufficiently small, rates arbitrarily
close to P (N ) can be achieved. A priori this is not clear for the locking capacities, although the
results presented in this paper show that at least certain weak locking rates, sometimes even
rates arbitrarily close to LW (N ), can be achieved with ǫ, δ = 2−Ω(n).
Remark 1 Guha et al. [12, Def. 1] give a very similar definition of locking, but demand the
much stronger condition that in eq. (3) the conditional distribution of m given each outcome
j has to be close to uniform. This however seems too restrictive, and not in line with the
usual modern definition of privacy in wiretap channels [8, 5], reflected in eq. (2); in fact, that
definition would assign a private capacity of zero to the perfectly innocent and well-understood
quantum erasure channel [34]. Thus we propose to use our criterion (3).
Guha et al. [12] also discuss the possibility of defining the weak locking property in terms
of the Shannon mutual information between m and j in eq. (3), the maximum of which over all
measurements is the accessible information
Iacc(M : E
n) = Iacc
({
1
M
, (N c)⊗n(ρm)
})
of the uniform ensemble of the eavesdropper’s output states. Likewise, the privacy of a code
could also have been characterized in terms of the quantum mutual information I(M : En),
which equals the Holevo information of the ensemble
{
1
M , (N c)⊗n(ρm)
}
. For a generic ensemble
E = {px, σx} of states on A, and corresponding cq-state
∑
x px|x〉〈x|X ⊗ σAx , these information
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quantities are defined as
I(X : A) = S(X) + S(A)− S(XA) = S(A)− S(A|X)
= χ(E) = S
(∑
x
pxσx
)
−
∑
x
pxS(σx),
Iacc(X : A) = Iacc(E) = max
POVM (Qy)
I(X : Y ) with Pr{X = x, Y = y} = pxTrσxQy.
By the Alicki-Fannes inequality [1], a δ-private code satisfies I(M : En) ≤ O(n)δ, and
likewise a δ-weakly-locking code satisfies Iacc(M : E
n) ≤ O(n)δ. Vice versa, Pinsker’s inequality
implies that I(M : En) ≤ ∆ and Iacc(M : En) ≤ ∆ imply
√
2∆-privacy and
√
2∆-weak-locking,
respectively (similarly for strong locking). Hence, as long as δ in our definitions above is o(1/n),
the resulting notions of weak and strong locking, as well as private, capacity, are equivalent to
the present ones.
In the present paper, we shall take a closer look at the weak locking capacity for so-called
degradable channels N , which means that there is a cptp map D : L(B) −→ L(E) satisfying
N c = D ◦ N . We call N anti-degradable iff the complementary channel N c is degradable. If a
channel N is both degradable and anti-degradable, and specifically if the degrading map D is
an isomorphism between B and E, we call it symmetric.
Remark 2 For degradable channels N , it is well-known [9, 34] that
P (N ) = Q(N ) = max
ρ
S(N (ρ))− S(N c(ρ)),
where the right hand side is the maximization of the coherent information, which is concave
in ρ. By definition, any private communication code is a weak locking code for N , hence
LW (N ) ≥ P (N ).
For an anti-degradable channel N , Q(N ) = P (N ) = 0 by the familiar “cloning argu-
ment” [4]. Below we will see that for the weak locking capacity this does not hold.
In [12] it had been left open whether the weak locking capacity is always equal to the private
capacity, or whether there can be a separation. For example, there it was shown that for channels
N such that the complementary channelN c is a qc-channel, then LW (N ) = P (N ); furthermore,
that if N is entanglement-breaking, then LW (N ) = P (N ) = 0. Note that the construction
in [22] (as well as [6]) may be taken as evidence for large gaps, but it is not sufficient to prove
this: Namely, in those papers it was pointed out that if at the end of a hypothetical key
agreement protocol Alice and Bob share perfect randomness, and their correlation with Eve is
described as
1
N
N∑
m=1
|m〉〈m|A ⊗ |m〉〈m|B ⊗ ρEm,
with a strongly-locking ensemble
{
1
N , ρm
}
, cf. eq. (4), then the key may not be secure at all
after a small portion (λ logN) of the shared secret has been leaked. Our contribution is to
show that this can indeed occur naturally in the above outlined setting of the quantum wiretap
channel.
Here we show a general lower bound on LW (N ) for channels N such that the complementary
channel N c is a cq-channel (these are automatically degradable); we establish basic properties
of these channels, including an upper bound on LW (N ), in the next Section 2. This bound can
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sometimes be much larger than P (Section 3). We also exhibit symmetric channels, hence with
vanishing private capacity, which nonetheless have positive weak locking capacity (Section 4).
After this we conclude with a discussion of our results in the context of regular quantum key
distribution (QKD) and several open questions, in Section 5.
2 Complements of cq-channels
One subclass we’ll be interested in are so-called Hadamard channels [21], specifically those that
are complementary channels of cq-channels [16]:
N c(|i〉〈i′|) = δii′ρEi , (5)
where {|i〉} is an orthonormal basis of A, and with ρEi = TrB |ψi〉〈ψi|BE , so that
N (|i〉〈i′|) = |i〉〈i′| ⊗ TrE |ψi〉〈ψi′ |. (6)
Note that in general, Hadamard channels are defined as complementary channels of entanglement-
breaking channels, which results in a wider class than the ones we are looking at here [21]. The
more restrictive class of channels in eq. (6) are also known as Schur multipliers.
The cq-channels are called so, because they are “classical-to-quantum” [16]. The opposite
concept of qc-channel (“quantum-to-classical”) models a measurement as a cptp map; for a
POVM (Qj), it is given by
N (ρ) =
∑
j
Tr ρQj |j〉〈j|. (7)
We begin with an upper bound on the weak locking capacity, to have a benchmark for our
lower bound later on.
Proposition 3 Let N : L(A) −→ L(B) be a Schur multiplier, i.e. a Hadamard channel whose
complementary channel N c : L(A) −→ L(E) is a cq-channel. Then,
LW (N ) ≤ max
(pi)
Sacc(I|E), where
Sacc(I|E) := min
(Qj)
H(I|J),
is the eavesdropper’s accessible equivocation. Here, (pi) is a probability distribution on the
computational basis states of A and (Qj) is a POVM on E, Pr{I = i, J = j} = piTr ρiQj .
Proof Basically, we evaluate the upper bound from [12, Thm. 8]: LW (N ) ≤ supn 1nL
(u)
W (N⊗n),
where
L
(u)
W (N ) = max
{px,ρx}
I(X : B)− Iacc(X : E) (8)
is optimized with respect to arbitrary ensembles {px, ρx} of states on A.
Choosing any probability distribution (pi) on the computational basis states ρi = |i〉〈i|, we
get I(I : B) = H(I) and hence L
(u)
W (N ) ≥ Sacc(I|E). Furthermore, for the tensor product
N1 ⊗N2 of two complements of cq-channels,
max
(pi1i2 )
Sacc(I1I2|E1E2) = max
(pi1 )
Sacc(I1|E1) + max
(pi2 )
Sacc(I2|E2),
by Lemma 4 below. This shows in fact that for any integer n, 1nL
(u)
W
(N⊗n) ≥ max(pi) Sacc(I|E).
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Thus, it remains to show L
(u)
W (N ) ≤ max(pi) Sacc(I|E). To do so, we shall first show that
for degradable channels, an optimal ensemble for eq. (8) consists w.l.o.g. of pure states ρx =
|ϕx〉〈ϕx|, and then in a second step that we can choose these pure states as computational basis
states, modifying the ensemble accordingly.
1. For the degradable channel N , choose a Stinespring isometry V0 : A →֒ B ⊗ E, and
for the degrading map an isometry V1 : B →֒ E′ ⊗ F . The accessible information requires a
measurement (Qj) – w.l.o.g. consisting of rank-one operators –, for whose associated qc-channel
we choose an isometry (acting on E′ but of course equally on E) V2 : E
′ →֒ J ⊗ J ′. Now, given
an ensemble E = {px, ρx},
I(X : B)− Iacc(X : E) = I(X : FJJ ′)− I(X : J)
= I(X : FJ ′|J)
= H(FJ ′|J)−H(FJ ′|JX),
(9)
where all expressions except the l.h.s. are with respect to the state
ωXFJJ
′
=
∑
x
px|x〉〈x|X ⊗
(
V2V1N (ρx)V †1 V †2
)FJJ ′
.
On the r.h.s. of eq. (9), H(FJ ′|J) depends only on ωFJJ ′ and so is unchanged if we replace
each ρx in E by any of its pure state decompositions. On the other hand,
H(FJ ′|JX)ω =
∑
x
pxH(FJ
′|J)
V2V1N (ρx)V
†
1
V †
2
,
and since the conditional entropy is concave in the state [23], this replacement can make the
latter quantity only smaller.
2. Now that we know that we may assume a pure state ensemble E = {px, ρx = |ϕx〉〈ϕx|},
we specialize to the complements of cq-channels. Looking at eqs. (5) and (6), we see that N c
is invariant, and N covariant, under conjugation by phase (diagonal) unitaries. By twirling the
ensemble by phase unitaries (i.e. replacing each |ϕx〉 by a uniform distribution over Udiag|ϕx〉),
we thus can only increase the r.h.s. of eq. (9) by leaving H(FJ ′|JX) alone while H(FJ ′|J) can
only increase, since ωFJJ
′
is now invariant under conjugation by phase unitaries.
The proof will be concluded by showing that
H(FJ ′|JX) =
∑
x
pxH(FJ
′|J)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)V
†
1
V †
2
can only decrease if we replace each |ϕx〉 =
∑
i αi|x|i〉 by the ensemble {pi|x = |αi|x|2, |i〉〈i|},
hence the original ensemble E by E˜ = {pxi = pxpi|x, |i〉〈i|}, which in turn has the same value of
the expression (9) as {pi =
∑
x pxi, |i〉〈i|}. Indeed, the corresponding ω˜ has the same reduction
on FJJ ′, ωFJJ
′
= ω˜FJJ
′
, and for every x, we have
H(FJ ′|J)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)V
†
1
V †
2
≥
∑
i
pi|xH(FJ
′|J)
V2V1N (|i〉〈i|)V
†
1
V †
2
. (10)
To see this, we expand the l.h.s. as
H(FJ ′|J)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx |)V
†
1
V †
2
= H(FJJ ′)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)V
†
1
V †
2
−H(J)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)V
†
1
V †
2
= S
(N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)) −H({TrN c(|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)Qj}j)
= S
(N c(|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)) −H({TrN c(|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)Qj}j),
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and observe N c(|ϕx〉〈ϕx|) =
∑
i pi|xN c(|i〉〈i|) =
∑
i pi|xρi =: ρ. While on the r.h.s., for each i,
H(FJ ′|J)
V2V1N (|i〉〈i|)V
†
1
V †
2
= H(FJJ ′)
V2V1N (|i〉〈i|)V
†
1
V †
2
−H(J)
V2V1N (|i〉〈i|)V
†
1
V †
2
= S
(N (|i〉〈i|)) −H({TrN c(|i〉〈i|)Qj}j)
= S
(N c(|i〉〈i|)) −H({TrN c(|i〉〈i|)Qj}j)
= S
(
ρi
)−H({Tr ρiQj}j).
Hence, the difference between l.h.s. and r.h.s. of eq. (10) is
H(FJ ′|J)
V2V1N (|ϕx〉〈ϕx|)V
†
1
V †
2
−
∑
i
pi|xH(FJ
′|J)
V2V1N (|i〉〈i|)V
†
1
V †
2
= S(ρ)−
∑
i
pi|xS(ρi)−H
({Tr ρQj}j)+∑
i
pi|xH
({Tr |i〉〈i|Qj}j)
= I(I : E)− I(I : J) ≥ 0,
the last inequality by the famous Holevo bound [15], and we are done. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4 For the tensor product of channels N1 and N2, each of which is the complement of
a cq-channel,
max
(pi1i2 )
Sacc(I1I2|E1E2) = max
(pi1 )
Sacc(I1|E1) + max
(pi2 )
Sacc(I2|E2).
Proof First, for any distribution (pi1i2), and any measurement POVM (Qj), we have, by
subadditivity of the entropy, H(I1I2|J) ≤ H(I1|J)+H(I2|J), hence, choosing the POVM to be
a tensor product of local POVMs, Qj1j2 = Qj1 ⊗Qj2 , we get
Sacc(I1I2|E1E2) ≤ Sacc(I1|E1) + Sacc(I2|E2).
On the other hand, consider a product distribution pi1i2 = pi1pi2 , the output of (N1 ⊗N2)c
is a product ensemble {pi1 , ρi1}⊗ {pi2 , ρi2}. For a generic POVM (Qj) on E1E2, we can switch
around the roles of the ensemble and of the POVM, observing that with ρ(b) =
∑
ib
pibρib and
the POVMs(!) composed of the operators Mib =
(
ρ(b)
)− 1
2 pibρib
(
ρ(b)
)− 1
2 (b = 0, 1),
Pr{I1 = i1, I2 = i2, J = j} = pi1pi2 Tr(ρi1 ⊗ ρi2)Qj
= Tr
(√
ρ(1) ⊗ ρ(2)Qj
√
ρ(1) ⊗ ρ(2)
)
(Mi1 ⊗Mi2)
=: qj Trσj(Mi1 ⊗Mi2).
Thus,
H(I1I2|J) =
∑
j
qjS
(
(M1 ⊗M2)σj
)
,
where Mb is the qc-channel representing the POVM (Mib) (b = 0, 1). This means
Sacc(I1I2|E1E2) = Ĥ
(M1 ⊗M2|ρ(1) ⊗ ρ(2)),
and likewise
Sacc(I1|E1) = Ĥ
(M1|ρ(1)), Sacc(I2|E2) = Ĥ(M2|ρ(2)),
where
Ĥ(M|σ) := min
{qj ,ψj}
∑
j
qjH
(M(ψj)) s.t. ∑
j
qjψj = σ
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is the constrained minimum output entropy. But now we can invoke [20, Lemma 3], by which
Ĥ
(M1 ⊗M2|ρ(1) ⊗ ρ(2)) = Ĥ(M1|ρ(1))+ Ĥ(M2|ρ(2)),
concluding the proof. ⊓⊔
Even though we do not make use of it here, we cannot pass without noting the following
fundamental property of the optimization of H(I|J):
Lemma 5 For an ensemble E = {pi, ρi} and a POVM Q = (Qj), the function η(E ;Q) =
H(I|J) is concave in E and convex (actually affine) in Q, in the following sense: For ensembles
E(0) = {p(0)i , ρi} and E(1) = {p(1)i , ρi} (without loss of generality sharing the same set of states),
E = λE(0) + (1− λ)E(1) = {λp(0)i + (1− λ)p(1)i , ρi} satisfies
η(λE(0) + (1− λ)E(1), Q) ≥ λη(E(0), Q) + (1− λ)η(E(1), Q).
Instead, for POVMs (Q
(0)
j ) and (Q
(1)
k ) on disjoint index sets {j} and {k}, Q = λQ(0) ⊕ (1 −
λ)Q(1) =
(
λQ
(0)
j , (1− λ)Q(1)k
)
satisfies
η(E , λQ(0) ⊕ (1− λ)Q(1)) = λη(E , Q(0)) + (1− λ)η(E , Q(1)).
Consequently,
max
(pi)
Sacc(I|E) = max
(pi)
min
(Qj)
H(I|J) = min
(Qj)
max
(pi)
H(I|J).
Proof The concavity property boils down to the concavity of the Shannon entropy. The
affine-linearity is evident from the definition. Finally, the minimax statement is an application
of the concavity in the first and convexity in the second argument, invoking von Neumann’s
minimax theorem [29, 33]. ⊓⊔
3 Lower bound on LW for complements of cq-channels
We shall need the following auxiliary lemma, which was proved by Damgaard et al. [7] in a
very similar form. In Appendix A we give a simple proof of it, based on the additivity of the
minimum output Re´nyi-entropy for entanglement-breaking channels [20].
Proposition 6 Consider a POVM M = (Mi) and its associated qc-channelM, with minimum
output entropy Ĥ(M) := min
ψ state
H(M(ψ)), where H(M(ψ)) = H({qi = TrψMi}). Then, for
any 0 < ǫ, δ < 1, and any state ψ on n input systems,
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− δ) − 16(log d)2 1
δ
log
1
ǫ
.
For a suitable choice of δ (depending on ǫ), we get (for sufficiently large n, ensuring that δ < 1):
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ nĤ(M)− 8(log d)√n log 1
ǫ
.
Here, Hǫmin is the smooth min-entropy [30]:
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Definition 7 For a state ρ, the min-entropy is Hmin(ρ) := − log ‖ρ‖, and the smooth min-
entropy
Hǫmin(ρ) = maxHmin(ρ
′) s.t.
1
2
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ≤ ǫ.
More generally, for a bipartite state ρAB,
Hmin(A|B)ρ := − logminλ s.t. ρAB ≤ λ(1A ⊗ σB), σ state
≥ − log
∥∥∥(1 ⊗ ρB)−1/2ρ(1 ⊗ ρB)−1/2∥∥∥ =: H∞(A|B)ρ,
and
Hǫmin(A|B)ρ := maxHmin(A|B)ρ′ s.t.
1
2
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 ≤ ǫ.
Remark 8 Unlike the nowadays standard definition of smooth (conditional) min-entropy, which
uses the so-called purified distance [36], we employ the trace distance. This is essentially equiv-
alent, since the two metrics are dominating each other (in fact, trace distance is upper bounded
by the purified distance). However, it makes for more direct application of classical randomness
extraction results later.
Note that for a qc-state ρAB =
∑
j qjρ
A
j ⊗ |j〉〈j|B ,
Hmin(A|B)ρ ≥ min
j
Hmin(ρj),
Hǫ+δmin(A|B)ρ ≥ minj∈T H
ǫ
min(ρj),
for any set T of indices with Pr{j 6∈ T } ≤ δ.
Corollary 9 Let {pi, ρi} be an ensemble on a Hilbert space E with associated average state ρ
and POVM (Mi = ρ
− 1
2 piρiρ
− 1
2 ). Then, for any POVM Q = (Qj) on E
n, i.i.d. I1, . . . , In ∼ (pi)
and 0 < δ < 1,
Hǫmin(I
n|J) ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− δ)− 16(log d)2 1
δ
log
1
ǫ
,
and for sufficiently large n,
Hǫmin(I
n|J) ≥ nĤ(M) − 8(log d)
√
n log
1
ǫ
.
Proof Simply use the trick to switch between ensembles and POVMs, to write
Pr{In = in, J = j} = pi1 · · · pin Tr(ρi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρin)Qj
= Tr
(√
ρ
⊗n
Qj
√
ρ
⊗n)
(Mi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Min)
= qj Trσj(Mi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Min).
Thus (cf. Remark 8),
Hǫmin(I
n|J) ≥ min
j
Hǫmin(I
n|J = j)
= min
j
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(σj))
≥ min
ψ
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)),
and the claim follows from the lower bound of Proposition 6. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 10 For any Schur multiplier, i.e. a Hadamard channel N : L(A) −→ L(B) whose
complementary channel N c : L(A) −→ L(E) is a cq-channel, N c(|i〉〈j|) = δijρi, consider a
distribution (pi) on the input computational basis states. Let (Mi = ρ
− 1
2 piρiρ
− 1
2 ) be the POVM
associated to the ensemble {pi, ρi} and denote the corresponding qc-channelM : L(E) −→ L(A).
Then,
LW (N ) ≥ Ĥ(M) = min
ψ state
H(M(ψ)).
Proof We first describe a secret key generation protocol in the sense of weak locking: Alice
generates i.i.d. I1, . . . , In ∼ (pi) and sends the basis states |I1〉 · · · |In〉 down the channel; Bob,
by the nature of the channel, receives these basis states without noise, and so the string In =
I1 . . . In serves as a raw key shared between them.
Eve on the other hand, after measuring a POVM Q on her output states and obtaining
outcomes J , has a certain min-entropy of In given J , which by Corollary 9 satisfies
Hǫmin(I
n|J) ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− δ)− 16(log d)2 1
δ
log
1
ǫ
.
Thus, using a min-entropy extractor with O(log n) bits of “seed” randomness (which Alice and
Bob are allowed as part of the sublinear amount of key they may pre-share), they can convert
almost all of the smooth min-entropy into almost-uniform key K that is almost-independent of
J ; cf. [37, Section 6.2] and references therein. Mathematically, the extractor (more precisely:
strong extractor) is given by a function e : In × S −→ K = {0, 1}nR, R = Ĥ(M) − 2δ and
|S| = poly(n). It has the property that for every random variable I(n) ∼ P (n) on In with min-
entropy ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− δ)− 16(log d)2 1δ log 1ǫ and uniformly distributed S ∈ S, K = e(I(n), S) is
almost uniformly distributed:
‖P(K,S)− UK ⊗ US‖1 ≤
1
poly(n)
, (11)
where UK ⊗ US is the uniform distribution on K × S. This implies by triangle inequality, for
Eve’s measurement result J ,
‖P(J,K, S) − P(J)⊗ UK ⊗ US‖1 ≤ η := ǫ+
1
poly(n)
. (12)
Observe that the bound 1poly(n) comes from adding the error terms
1
poly(|S|) and 2
−nΩ(δ) of the
extractor [37]. Thus, making the seed space S larger we can suppress η more, up to any quantity
decaying to zero slower than exponentially.
Now, to obtain a scheme to securely send uniformly distributed messages from K, we “run
the extractor backwards”: From the joint distribution of In [i.i.d. according to (pi)], S (uniform)
and K = e(In, S) we can construct a conditional distribution P(In|K,S) =: E(in|k, s), which
describes a stochastic encoding mapping E : K × S −→ In. Note that we may assume In =
E(K,S) as random variables.
To send the uniformly distributed message K̂ ∈ K, Alice and Bob share a uniformly dis-
tributed private Ŝ ∈ S, and Alice puts Î(n) = E(K̂, Ŝ) ∈ In. We claim that this is a good code.
Indeed, since he gets Î(n) from the channel output, and using Ŝ, Bob can decode K̂ = e(Î(n), Ŝ)
with certainty.
On the other hand, Eve can obtain almost no information about K̂, because eq. (11) means∥∥∥P(K,S)− P(K̂, Ŝ)∥∥∥
1
≤ η,
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hence, applying the encoding map E,∥∥∥P(In,K, S) − P(Î(n), K̂, Ŝ)∥∥∥
1
≤ η.
Applying the complementary channel as well as Eve’s POVM Q, we find∥∥∥P(J,K, S) − P(Ĵ , K̂, Ŝ)∥∥∥
1
≤ η.
Putting this together with eq. (12), and tracing out the seed, we finally obtain∥∥∥P(Ĵ , K̂)− P(J)⊗ UK∥∥∥
1
≤ 2η,
and letting ǫ and δ go to zero (slow enough) as n→∞, we are done. ⊓⊔
Remark 11 By using a seed of o(n) bits in eq. (11), and choosing ǫ = 2−o(n) in eq. (12), we
get η-weak-locking codes, with asymptotically the same rate and η = 2−o(n).
Example 12 Consider |E| = d, |A| = |B| = 2d and the cq-channel N c with pure output states
|v0i〉 = |i〉 and |v1i〉 = |ϕi〉 (i = 1, . . . , d), which are the eigenstates of the generalized Z and X
operators, respectively.
Using the concavity of the coherent information and the covariance of the channel under the
action of the discrete Weyl group, it is easy to see that the coherent information is maximized
for the uniform input, and so
P (N ) = 1. (13)
On the other hand, for uniform input distribution over the 2d basis states, the POVM(
1
2M0i
)∪ (12M1i), where Mbi = |vbi〉〈vbi|, is the random choice of one of the observables X or Z,
and measurement of its eigenbasis. By the Maassen-Uffink entropic uncertainty relation [26],
Ĥ(M) = 1 + 12 log d, which by Theorem 10 is a lower bound on LW (N ). By Proposition 3
it is also an upper bound, since regardless of the input distribution over the computational
basis states i0, i1, Eve can randomly choose and measure either X or Z, and get an accessible
equivocation of at most 1 + 12 log d. Hence,
LW (N ) = 1 + 1
2
log d; (14)
and thus the gap between the private and (weak) locking capacities of a d-dimensional channel
can be as large as a constant versus Ω(log d).
The Choi-Jamio lkowski state obtained from using the above channel with maximally entan-
gled input was previously considered by Christandl et al. [6, Sec. 6], finding the same numbers
for the secret key rate as eqs. (13) and (14) as secret key rate against quantum and classical
eavesdropper, respectively. Note however that for the latter conclusion they have to assume that
Eve applies the same measurement to each copy of the shared state. The proof of Theorem 10
shows that the conclusion of [6] holds for arbitrary measurements of the n systems in Eve’s
possession. ⊓⊔
In the next section, we shall exhibit an example of an even more striking effect: a channel
whose private capacity, and indeed key generation capacity, is zero, because Bob and Eve see
the exact same quantum information, but whose locking capacity is arbitrarily large.
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4 Symmetric channels with LW > 0 = P
Compared to Section 3, are there even channels with vanishing private capacity, i.e. P (N ) = 0,
but positive locking capacity, LW (N ) > 0? Note that the construction in the previous section,
to yield non-zero locking capacity, requires a degradable Hadamard channel, and so its private
capacity is also non-zero. In this case, note also that the sublinear pre-shared key between Alice
and Bob is unnecessary, since they can use a sublinear number of channel uses and a private
code to create the key from scratch.
In this section we consider symmetric channels, which trivially have P = 0; on the other
hand, the pre-shared key, even if only sublinear, can be enough of an advantage to get a locking
capacity. For concreteness, let us look a little closer at the channel
S : L(Sym2(B)) −→ L(B), (15)
with B ≃ E ≃ Cd, which has as its Stinespring dilation the isometric embedding of the d × d
symmetric subspace A = Sym2(B) ≃ Cd(d+1)/2 into B ⊗ E.
One “reasonable” strategy to encode information is this: Use the product states |ψ〉|ψ〉 ∈ A,
which yield the same pure output state |ψ〉 for both Bob and Eve, or rather sequences of such
state on n channel uses. Now, similar to the protocol in Section 3, use input states which
result in either Z-basis or X-basis eigenstates output (equally for Bob and Eve, obviously),
on small blocks of size k in n transmissions, so that only nk bits of key are required for both
Alice and Bob to know the basis and to have a perfect communication channel. On the other
hand, Eve, without this bit of basis information faces uniformly random states in one of two
mutually unbiased bases in dimension dk, namely the Z eigenstates |ik〉 and the X eigenstates
|ϕik〉. Hence, for any POVM Q = (Qj) on Ek,
H(I|J) ≥ min
ψ
S
(M(ψ)) = 1 + 1
2
k log d,
and so we can invoke Proposition 6 and Corollary 9: For ℓ = nk uses of this scheme we obtain,
for the measurement outcomes J of an arbitrary POVM (Qj),
Hǫmin(I
ℓ|J) ≥ n
(
1
2
− δ
k
)
log d+
n
k
− 16k
2(log d)2
δ
log
1
ǫ
≥ n
(
1
2
− δ
k
)
log d,
where for the last line we have made the choice
k = 3
√
n
δ
16(log d)2 log 1ǫ
.
Now the argument progresses as in Section 3: on top of the nk bits of key, we use another
o(n) bits for the randomness extractor. The key rate goes to zero as long as k −→ ∞. We see
that we can achieve the locking rate 12 log d, and even let
δ
k and ǫ go to 0 sufficiently slowly: for
instance, constant δ and ǫ = 2−n
γ
, with any γ < 1. Thus we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 13 The symmetric subspace channel S : L(Sym2(Cd)) −→ L(Cd) has zero private
capacity, P (S) = 0 (since it gives a copy of every output state of Bob to Eve), but LW (S) ≥
1
2 log d. ⊓⊔
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This result dramatically improves the argument in [22] and [6]: Here we have a regular
quantum cryptographic system, which could be BB84 sending a copy of each of the four states
not only to Bob but also to Eve, very much like in the “photon number splitting attack” [18] –
hence there can be no private communication capacity in the present setting of only a sublinear
pre-shared key. But it can be perfectly good key as judged by the accessible information of Eve.
Remark 14 It may even be possible to show that for large enough d, the locking capacity
LW (S) can be arbitrarily close to C(N ) = log d, by using encodings into m > 2 many bases.
What we would need is that repeating the basis a small number of times would still result in a
“strong” uncertainty relation (cf. [38]), as it was shown for k = 1 in [13] and [11].
To be precise, denote the bases (Ut|i〉)di=1, with unitaries Ut (t = 0, . . . ,m), so that we
get m “repeated” bases U⊗kt , each of which defines an orthogonal measurement
(
M
(t)
ik
=
U⊗kt |ik〉〈ik|U⊗kt
†)
. The question then is, whether it is possible to find Ut such that for all
states ψ on (Cd)⊗k,
1
m
m∑
t=1
H
({TrψM (t)
ik
}ik
) ≥ c(k,m) log dk,
with c(k,m)→ 1 as k →∞ and m ≤ 2kc for some 0 < c < 1. With such an uncertainty relation
in hand, we could go through the proof of Theorem 13, letting n = poly(k) as before and thus
using ∼ nk kc = o(n) bits of key, while attaining a locking rate of c(k,m) log d.
5 Conclusion and possible further developments
Our results on separations between P (N ) and LW (N ), Theorems 10 and 13, and Example 12,
have an interpretation in terms of quantum key distribution (QKD): N may be the effective
channel between Alice and Bob if Eve applies a so-called collective attack, the same and known
isometry V to all transmissions. In fact, the security definition of the weak locking capacity
is the old-style notion put forward in the very first complete analyses of BB84 and related
protocols [27], cf. the historical account in the nice review [32] (footnote 20). Indeed, in these
older texts, it was assumed that it is enough to bound the “knowledge of Eve about the key”,
understood as the (Shannon) information she can obtain by making a suitable measurement
after collecting all sorts of quantum and classical systems during the protocol. The definition
of LW (N ) is essentially based on taking this notion of cryptographic security of the key lit-
erally. It was only with the discovery of quantum information locking [10] and its subsequent
development [13, 11] that it was eventually understood that this is a very badly behaved secu-
rity criterion, in particular not composable, and subject to chosen plaintext attacks (where the
eavesdropper has side-information about the message to be transmitted) [22, 6]. The timing
problem of when the measurement should take place, and hence whether side-information be-
comes available before or after it, is at the heart of this issue, and has been investigated in its
own right [3]. The new, modern, information theoretic security definition [30] is at the basis of
the notion of private capacity P (N ).
Furthermore, Theorem 13 shows that it is possible for the locking capacity to be positive
where “evidently”, due to the symmetry of the channel between legal and eavesdropping users,
there can be no secrecy. The coding scheme may even be interpreted in the context of the
famous photon number splitting attack on coherent state based QKD protocols [18]: the protocol
of Theorem 13 is as if Alice always prepares a state of two photons, in fact two identical copies
of her chosen polarization – and naturally Bob and Eve each get one.
The main open question about the Hadamard channels considered in Section 3 is, whether
Sacc(I|E), or in other words, the constrained minimum output entropy of the associated POVM
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for a given distribution (pi) of the inputs,
Ĥ(M|σ) = min
{qj ,ψj}
∑
j
qjH
(M(ψj)) s.t. ∑
j
qjψj = σ,
is an achievable locking rate.
The obvious first step to try would be to consider the Re´nyi entropic version of this,
Ĥα(M|σ) = minHα(I|J) s.t.
∑
j
qjψj = σ,
where
Hα(I|J) = − α
α− 1 log
∑
j
qj
(∑
i
(TrψjMi)
α
)1/α
is the conditional α-entropy (cf. [28, Def. 4], where the classical case is attributed to Arimoto [2]).
Note that it relates to the smooth conditional min-entropy and the conditional von Neumann
entropy in analogous ways as the non-conditional versions [36], here stated as Lemmas 16 and
18 in Appendix A.
What is missing is an additivity proof. So this is the question: for two POVMs M (1) and
M (2), and states σ1 and σ2, does it hold that
Ĥα(M(1) ⊗M(2)|σ1 ⊗ σ2) = Ĥα(M(1)|σ1) + Ĥα(M(2)|σ2) ? (16)
[Note that “≤” is trivially true.] If that is the case, we are done, by substituting Ĥα(M|σ) for
the simpler, and smaller, Ĥα(M), in the proof of Theorem 10. In the limit α → 1 this is true
by [20, Lemma 3]; see also the proof of our Lemma 4.
This would give the weak locking capacity for those channels, since the achievable rate,
optimized over all input distributions, i.e. LW (N ) ≥ max
(pi)
Sacc(I|E), would then match the
multi-letter converse from [12] for these channels, which by Proposition 3 for the present channels
simplifies to LW (N ) ≤ max
(pi)
Sacc(I|E).
It should be noted, that what we really need is a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of
the i.i.d. In conditioned on the measurement outcomes J from the POVM on En, of the form
Hǫmin(I
n|J)
?
& n
(
Sacc(I|E)− δ
)
, (17)
analogous to [7]. This would be implied by eq. (16) being true, along the lines of the proof in
Appendix A. But even if the additivity fails there might be a direct proof of eq. (17).
Going on to more general channels, we could then approach the problem of how tight is the
upper bound on LW (N ) in terms of the regularization of
L
(u)
W (N ) = max
{px,ρx}
I(X : B)− Iacc(X : E).
This seems a difficult question, as it has to be noted that there is no obvious way how to attain
it as a rate for a locking code. The problem lies in the term I(X : B), which suggests that we
should select a code for the channel on blocks of length n, rather than i.i.d. copies Xn, cf. [8, 5].
But when the i.i.d. ensemble structure of the inputs Xn is disrupted, the accessible information
Iacc(X
n : En) can possibly change dramatically, because of the very locking effect [10].
A possible way forward would be to allow the use of another, private, channel, let’s say
for concreteness a noiseless channel of sufficiently large dimension k. Then, Alice can use
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an ensemble decomposition of the i.i.d. Xn into good codes for the channel N⊗n to Bob,
choose one of them at random and inform him about the choice over the auxiliary channel; any
log k & H(X|B) will do. Via the code she can send I(X : B) bits per channel use to Bob. For
Eve, on the other hand, the noiseless channel idk does not yield any information, and N appears
to be used with i.i.d. Xn from her point of view. Then, assuming the additivity hypothesis (16),
or rather the min-entropy uncertainty relation (17) above, this “raw key” can be hashed down
to Sacc(X|E) locked bits per channel use. By the same argument of “running the extractor
backwards” as in the proof of Theorem 10, we thus would get LW (N ⊗ idk) ≥ L(u)W (N )+ log k =
L
(u)
W (N ⊗ idk).
This sketch of a proof should suffice to show the following:
Theorem 15 If the additivity hypothesis (16), or more specifically, the min-entropy uncertainty
relation (17) is true, then for N the complement of a cq-channel,
LW (N ) = max
(pi)
Sacc(I|E) = L(u)W (N ).
Furthermore, for an arbitrary channel N , the activated (or amortized) weak locking capac-
ity LW (N ) := supk LW (N ⊗ idk)− log k ≥ LW (N ) is given by
LW (N ) = sup
n
1
n
L
(u)
W (N⊗n). ⊓⊔
Of course, we do not know at this point whether LW (N ) = LW (N ) for all channels. Note
however that strict inequality would imply that LW is non-additive even when combining a
noisy channel with a noiseless one. On the other hand, maybe LW is a more natural definition
of locking capacity, since the (amortized) use of the noiseless channel really amounts to allowing
a linear secret key rate, rather than a sublinear amount, but letting the users pay for it.
Regarding the original locking capacity papers [24, 12], a very interesting problem would be
to find a nontrivial lower bound on the weak locking capacity of Gaussian channels, such as the
pure loss Bosonic channel. Indeed, maybe the 50%-lossy channel, which has private capacity 0,
can be analyzed along the lines of Section 4? Note however, that from [12] we have a constant
upper bound on its weak locking capacity, irrespective of the input power, at least for coherent
state encodings. It may be observed here that indeed [12, Thms. 26 and 27] hold also for more
general encodings into statistical mixtures of coherent states, which would be the kind of code
that our main constructions would yield, even starting from pure coherent state ensembles.
Finally, to close this long list of open questions, let us turn to the strong locking capacity [12],
which we have not touched upon at all in this paper. In fact, there might be link between weak
and strong locking, suggested by a simple generalization of the symmetric channel (15):
Sk : L
(
Symk(B)
) −→ L(B),
with B ≃ Cd and E ≃ Symk−1(B) ⊂ (Cd)⊗k−1, which has as its Stinespring dilation the isomet-
ric embedding of the k-fold symmetric subspace A = Symk(B) into B ⊗ E. The generalization
of the scheme in Section 4 would be to encode information into |ψ〉⊗k ∈ A, so that Bob gets one,
Eve instead k − 1 copies of |ψ〉, chosen from one of several bases determined by the pre-shared
key. It seems quite reasonable to expect that all of these (anti-degradable) channels have posi-
tive weak locking capacity. But weak locking for Sk implies strong locking for Sk−1, and so we
expect that LS(Sk) ≥ LW (Sk+1) > 0 for all k ≥ 2.
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A High-order min-entropy uncertainty relation
via additivity of output Re´nyi entropies
Here we give a simple direct proof of Proposition 6. In [7], it was first shown using Azuma’s
inequality for tails of martingales and a nontrivial truncation trick. The following proof rests
on lower bounding the smooth min-entropy in terms of Re´nyi entropies, and lower bounding the
latter in terms of von Neumann entropies. This idea can be traced back to [35]. The relevant
lemmas are stated here for completeness, and they are direct corollaries of the citations given.
Lemma 16 (Renner/Wolf [31]) For any state ρ and α > 1,
Hǫmin(ρ) ≥ Hα(ρ)−
1
α− 1 log
1
ǫ
. ⊓⊔
Remark 17 Under smoothing with respect the purified distance, the above relation would read
Hǫmin(ρ) ≥ Hα(ρ)−
1
α− 1 log
2
ǫ2
.
(Cf. Tomamichel [36, Prop. 6.2].) As pointed out already, in the present paper we are using
instead the smoothing w.r.t. the trace norm.
Lemma 18 (Tomamichel [36, Lemma 6.3]) For any state ρ on a d-dimensional Hilbert
space, and 1 < α < 1 + log 34 log ν , with ν = 2 +
√
d,
Hα(ρ) ≥ H(ρ)− 4(α − 1)(log ν)2.
A simplified version reads thus: For 1 < α < 1 + log 316 log d and d ≥ 2,
Hα(ρ) ≥ H(ρ)− 16(α− 1)(log d)2. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 6) By Lemma 16, for arbitrary n and state ψ,
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ Hα(M⊗n(ψ)) − 1
α− 1 log
1
ǫ
.
On the other hand, by the additivity of the minimum output α-Re´nyi entropy of qc-channels,
and more generally entanglement-breaking channels [19, 20],
Hα
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ nĤα(M),
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with Ĥα(M) := min
ψ state
Hα
(
M(ψ)
)
. Hence, using now Lemma 18,
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− 16(α − 1)(log d)2)− 1
α− 1 log
1
ǫ
,
as along as α is close enough to 1. Letting α = 1 + δ
16(log d)2
, we conclude
Hǫmin
(M⊗n(ψ)) ≥ n(Ĥ(M)− δ)− 16(log d)2 1
δ
log
1
ǫ
. ⊓⊔
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